http://lists.xen.org/archives/html/xen-changelog/2014-05/msg00096.html
http://lists.xen.org/archives/html/xen-changelog/2014-05/msg00163.html
XEN_DOMCTL_pausedomain:
A loop over vcpu_sleep_sync() for each of vCPU in the domain. That
function itself has a loop waiting for the subject vCPU to become non-
runnable, which ought to complete quickly (involving an IPI to be sent
and acted on). No other unbounded resource usage.
XEN_DOMCTL_unpausedomain:
Simply a loop calling vcpu_wake() (not having any loops or other
resource usage itself) for each of vCPU in the domain.
XEN_DOMCTL_getdomaininfo:
Two loops (one over all domains, i.e. bounded by the limit of 32k
domains, and another over all vCPU-s in the domain); no other
unbounded resource usage.
XEN_DOMCTL_getpageframeinfo:
Inquiring just a single MFN, i.e. no loops and no other unbounded
resource usage.
XEN_DOMCTL_getpageframeinfo{2,3}:
Number of inquired MFNs is limited to 1024. Beyond that just like
XEN_DOMCTL_getpageframeinfo.
XEN_DOMCTL_getvcpuinfo:
Only obtaining information on the vCPU, no loops or other resource
usage.
XEN_DOMCTL_setdomainhandle:
Simply a memcpy() of a very limited amount of data.
XEN_DOMCTL_setdebugging:
A domain_{,un}pause() pair (see XEN_DOMCTL_{,un}pausedomain) framing
the setting of a flag.
XEN_DOMCTL_hypercall_init:
Initializing a guest provided page with hypercall stubs. No other
resource consumption.
XEN_DOMCTL_arch_setup:
IA64 leftover, interface structure being removed from the public
header.
XEN_DOMCTL_settimeoffset:
Setting a couple of guest state fields. No other resource consumption.
XEN_DOMCTL_getvcpuaffinity:
XEN_DOMCTL_getnodeaffinity:
Involve temporary memory allocations (approximately) bounded by the
number of CPUs in the system / number of nodes built for, which is
okay. Beyond that trivial operation.
XEN_DOMCTL_real_mode_area:
PPC leftover, interface structure being removed from the public
header.
XEN_DOMCTL_resumedomain:
A domain_{,un}pause() pair framing operation very similar to
XEN_DOMCTL_unpausedomain (see above).
XEN_DOMCTL_sendtrigger:
Injects an interrupt (SCI or NMI) without any other resource
consumption.
XEN_DOMCTL_subscribe:
Updates the suspend event channel, i.e. affecting only the controlled
domain.
XEN_DOMCTL_disable_migrate:
XEN_DOMCTL_suppress_spurious_page_faults:
Just setting respective flags on the domain.
XEN_DOMCTL_get_address_size:
Simply reading the guest property.
XEN_DOMCTL_set_opt_feature:
Was already tagged IA64-only.
XEN_DOMCTL_set_cpuid:
MAX_CPUID_INPUT bounded loop, which is okay. No other resource
consumption.
XEN_DOMCTL_get_machine_address_size:
Simply obtaining the value set by XEN_DOMCTL_set_machine_address_size
(or the default set at domain creation time).
XEN_DOMCTL_gettscinfo:
XEN_DOMCTL_settscinfo:
Reading/writing of a couple of guest state fields wrapped in a
domain_{,un}pause() pair.
XEN_DOMCTL_audit_p2m:
Enabled only in debug builds.
XEN_DOMCTL_set_max_evtchn:
While the limit set here implies other (subsequent) resource usage,
this is the purpose of the operation.
I also verified that all removed domctls' handlers don't leak
hypervisor memory contents .
Inspected but questionable (and hence left in place for now):
XEN_DOMCTL_max_mem:
While only setting the field capping a domain's allocation (this
implies potential successive resource usage, but that's the purpose of
the operation). However, XSM doesn't see the value that's being set
here, so the net effect would be potential unbounded memory use.
XEN_DOMCTL_set_virq_handler:
This modifies a global array. While that is the purpose of the
operation, if multiple domains are granted permission they can badly
interfere with one another. Hence I'd appreciate a second opinion
here. [Andrew confirms that this being the nature of the operation,
it's fine to be removed from the list - will be done in a 2nd round.]
XEN_DOMCTL_irq_permission:
XEN_DOMCTL_ioport_permission:
Of both IRQs and I/O ports there is only a reasonably small amount, so
there's no excess resource consumption involved here. Additionally
they both have a specialized XSM hook associated.
XEN_DOMCTL_iomem_permission:
While this also has a specialized XSM hook associated (just like
XEN_DOMCTL_{irq,ioport}_permission), it's not clear whether it's
reasonable to expect XSM to restrict the number of ranges associated
with a domain via this hook (which is the main resource consumption
item here).
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